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DO COURTS SET ECONOMIC POLICY?
Justice Ben F. Overton*
Most members of the public, including many within the business
community, fail to realize that courts are major decision-makers of
economic policy. Further, in many instances, neither the lawyers presenting the case nor the judge hearing the case consider the potential
economic impact that the court's holding may have on industry or
consumers.
In this article, I will illustrate how courts are thrust into the
position of deciding economic policy and will suggest that the litigants
need to make the courts more cognizant of the relevant economic
principles.
The fact that courts make economic policy is nothing new.' A clear
example of this is the well-established common law rule against per-

*Justice Overton, the second annual Huber Hurst Distinguished Lecturer, delivered this
lecture on April 3, 1989, to students at the College of Business Administration. He received
his B.S.B.A. and J.D. degrees from the University of Florida and an LL.M. in Jurisprudence
from the University of Virginia. He served as a circuit court judge for nearly ten years before
his appointment to the Florida Supreme Court in 1974. Justice Overton was the first supreme
court justice selected under the Merit Selection System. During 1976-78, Justice Overton served
as Chief Justice. He was awarded the Florida Bar Foundation's medal of honor in 1984. Justice
Overton is currently the Senior Justice on the Court.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to his law clerk, Mark Dern, University of
Florida, College of Law, Class of 1988, for his valuable assistance in the research and preparation
of this article.
1. As Richard Posner, a well-known author on law and economics states:
The application of economics to law is not in itself either new or controversial.
What is new and controversial is the variety of problems in the world of law to
which economics is now being applied ....

Until about 15 years ago the term

"law and economics" primarily signified the application of economics to antitrust
law, although there was some scattered but important economic work on taxation,
corporations, and public utility and common carrier regulation. The use of economics
in antitrust law was conventional and unthreatening. The records in antitrust cases
provided a rich mine of information about business practices, and economists set
about to discover the economic rationales and consequences of such practices. Their
discoveries had implications for legal policy, of course, but basically what they
were doing was no different from what economists traditionally have done - trying
to explain the behavior of explicit economic markets.
1
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petuities, which restricts transfers of real and personal property, stating: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest. 2 The judiciary established this rule in 1682 because "the public
welfare was threatened by the desires of the great families to parcel
out the soil of England among them and impose upon it the dead-hand
control of perpetual family settlements."3 The purpose of the rule was
"to prevent the restraint on alienation that may result from the creation of a series of future interests some of which might neither vest
nor fail within the perpetuities period, '4 thus assuring that land would
become productive at some reasonable time in the future. If a court
rendered this rule today, the newspaper headlines would most likely
read: "Court Sets Major Land Reform Policy."
Years later, economic concerns, including the need for a single
form of currency, free and open commerce between the states, a
consistent economic policy with foreign countries, and the protection
of private property rights, constituted significant factors uniting the
delegates of our Constitutional Convention. 5 To a great extent, the
United States Constitution was brought about to establish and protect
a free market system. Referring to taxation and tariff restraints between states, James Madison wrote before the Constitutional Convention: "New Jersey, . . . placed between Philadelphia and New York,
was likened to a cask tapped at both ends; and North Carolina, between
'6
Virginia and South Carolina, to a patient bleeding at both arms."

. . . [T]he hallmark of the "new" law and economics - the law and economics
that is almost entirely new within the last decade and a half - is the application
of the theories and empirical methods of economics to the legal system across the
board - to common law fields such as tort, contract, and property, to the theory
and practice of punishment, to civil, criminal, and administrative procedure, to the
theory of legislation, and to law enforcement and judicial administration. Whereas
the "old" law and economics confined its attention to laws governing explicit
economic relationships, and indeed to a quite limited subset of such laws (the law
of contracts, for example, was omitted), the "new" law and economics recognizes
no such limitation on the domain of economic analysis of law.
R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 15-16 (2d ed. 1977).
2.

J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 191 (4th ed. 1942).

3. Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 721, 725-26 (1952). The first decision concerning the rule against perpetuities was the
Duke of Norfolk's Case, 22 ENG. REP. 931 (ch. 1682). For a more complete history of the rule,
see Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand: Reflections on the Origins of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19 (1977).
4. R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.17
(Lawyers ed. 1984).
5. Dolbeare & Mecalf, The PoliticalEconomy of the Constitution, THIS CONSTITUTION 4.
6. Quoted in C. BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA 9 (1966).
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After the Constitution was adopted and the government was organized, it did not take long for the judiciary to establish itself as the
branch responsible for construing the Constitution. 7 Many cases involving constitutional construction were initiated for economic reasons.
Although many may find it hard to believe, the principal basis for a
number of economic decisions is the fourteenth amendment, which
was adopted immediately after the Civil War in 1868.8 It states, in
pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." While the amendment was
created to protect the rights afforded minorities, especially blacks,1°
courts, towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning
of the twentieth century, construed the amendment to protect the
business community against unwanted regulation.1 In 1886, in Santa
2 Chief Justice Waite of the United
Clarav. Southern PacificRailroad,1
States Supreme Court commented on behalf of the Court that the
fourteenth amendment applied not only to persons but to corporations
as well. 13 About twenty years later, in Lochner v. New York, 14 the
Court found that a New York statute, which restricted the number16
15
of hours bakers could work, violated the fourteenth amendment.
The Court held that "the freedom of master and employ6 to contract
with each other in relation to their employment, and in defining the
same, cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without violating the
Federal Constitution.' 1 7 As stated by one commentator, "These deci7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
8. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 616 (2d ed. 1983)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 8.
11. Id. at 435.
12. 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
13. Id. at 396; J. LIEBERMAN, MILESTONES 174 (1976).
14. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15. The applicable statute, § 110, stated:
No employd shall be required or permitted to work in a biscuit, bread or cake
bakery or confectionery establishment more than sixty hours in any one week, or
more than ten hours in any one day, unless for the purpose of making a shorter
work day on the last day of the week; nor more hours in any one week than will
make an average of ten hours per day for the number of days during such week
in which such employ6 shall work.
Id. at 46 n.1.
16. Id. at 64; J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 13, at 177-78.
17. 198 U.S. at 64.
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sions transformed the Fourteenth Amendment from a constitutional
provision intended to secure the rights of minorities - particularly
the blacks - to a charter of economic laissez faire that corporations
could use to have courts void unfavorable legislations.' ' is As Nowak,
Rotunda, and Young stated:
Many of the Supreme Court justices believed they had an
obligation to protect the free enterprise system as it was
embodied in the concept of laissez faire. It must be stressed
that their position resulted from their independent reading
of the Constitution and the historic economic freedom of
action in American life rather than from some arbitrary desire to protect big business. 19
The construction of this provision has changed over time. Today it
reflects the drafters' initial intentions - that is, protecting minorities;
however, the term "persons" within the fourteenth amendment still
includes corporations.20
Although courts have made major economic decisions in the first
two hundred years of this country's existence, they will render even
more in the future. This country has progressed from an agrarian
society to a highly regulated industrial and service-oriented society.
Due to the substantial increase in governmental regulation of business
entities, the courts are now responsible for resolving numerous regulatory questions having considerable economic impact. To illustrate
the type of economic impact decisions state courts encounter, I have
selected five recent cases which were argued before the Florida Supreme Court between November 1988 and February 1989. It should
be noted that these five are but a few of the cases argued before the
court involving economic implications.
In Interest on Trust Accounts: A Petition to Amend the Rules
Regulating the FloridaBar,21 the Supreme Court of Florida recently
held that Florida should adopt a mandatory interest on trust accounts
(IOTA) program requiring attorneys to place nominal and short-term
trust funds into interest-bearing trust accounts.- The rule provides

18. J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 13, at 178.
19. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 8, at 438 (footnote omitted).
20. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985); Des Vergnes v.
Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1979); Fulton Mkt. Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton,
582 F.2d 1071, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1978); Sterngass v. Bowman, 563 F. Supp. 456
(D.C.N.Y. 1983).
21. 538 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1989).
22. Id. at 451.
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that the interest generated by these accounts would go directly to the
Florida Bar Foundation, which uses a substantial portion of the interest on these trust funds to provide legal aid to indigent persons.3
The Special Commission on Access to the Legal System estimated
that the interest generated would provide the fund with more than
$12 million a year.- Prior to the adoption of this rule, neither the
lawyers nor the clients received interest on the funds. In fact, the
beneficiaries of the earned-interest were the banks.H The economic
effect of the rule was the movement of earned-interest income from
the banking industry to a legal program aiding indigents.
In Ivey v. Bacardi Imports Co.,26 the Supreme Court of Florida
was called upon to construe and enforce the commerce clause of the
United States Constitution. The commerce clause states: "The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
27
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.
The purpose of the commerce clause was to ensure "free and unrestricted trade among the several states. '" In Bacardi, the Supreme
Court of Florida affirmed the trial court's finding that sections
564.06(1)-(10) and 565.12(1)-(5), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), created
to impose discriminatory taxes to benefit Florida's wine-distilling industry, were unconstitutional under the commerce clause.- Since Colonial times, state and local governmental entities have used taxes or
tax exemptions for local industries as a means to provide competitive
economic advantages. The courts are generally the governmental entity given the responsibility to determine what is proper in these cases.
In another area reflecting economic decision-making, courts are
frequently asked to determine what is the requisite duty of care and
who should bear the risk of loss and injury in our society. In Insinga
v. LaBella,3 0 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

23. Id. at 450; Matter of Interest on Trusts Accounts, 372 So. 2d 67, 68 (Fla. 1979); Interest
on Trust Accounts, A Petition of The Florida Bar, 356 So. 2d 799, 805 (Fla. 1978).
24. 538 So. 2d at 450 n.3 (citing Recommendations of the Special Commission on Access to
the Legal System 8 (May 16, 1985)).
25. 356 So. 2d at 802. "Even small amounts received from a variety of clients for varying
periods can result in large average monthly balances in attorney trust accounts." Id. at 802 n.20.
26. 541 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1989).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
28. 541 So. 2d at 1137. "The delegates adopted the clause to prevent tariffs among the
states and to unify the states' relationships with other nations." See Comment, Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: Dismantling a Nation of Many Sovereign States, 37
MERCER L. REV. 523, 526 (1985) (citing THE FEDERALIST, No. 42, at 305-06 (J. Madison)
(B. Wright ed. 1974)).
29. 541 So. 2d at 1131.
30. 543 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1989).
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Circuit asked the Supreme Court of Florida to determine whether
Florida recognizes the recently developed "corporate negligence doctrine, ''3 which imposes on hospitals "an independent duty to select
and retain competent independent physicians seeking staff
privileges." The court, in holding that hospitals owe such a duty,
effectively broadened the hospitals' responsibility and accountability
to their patients.3 Now, hospitals, along-with the doctors, are responsible for injuries caused by a physician's negligent act when a hospital
improperly selects or retains that physician for staff privileges. This
increased duty could result in higher costs to hospitals, which might
be reflected in higher charges for medical care.
Another decision which involved a potential increase in the duty
of care owed by one party to another is Leon County School Board
v. Grimes.3 In Grimes, an employee, who was required to wear a leg
brace as a result of contracting polio as a child, fell and injured herself
at work when her brace gave way. After suffering an ankle injury
from the fall, she sought workers' compensation benefits from her
employer. The deputy commissioner determined that her personal
physical condition caused the injury.
The duty of care at that time limited industry's liability to those
injuries caused by employment.3 The Supreme Court of Florida had
established that principle as the legislative purpose of the Workers'
Compensation Act.3 6 In Grimes, the district court of appeal reversed
the deputy commissioner37 and suggested that the supreme court
broaden the purpose of workers' compensation "to provide compensability of any injury to a worker during the course of his or her employment resulting from a fall at any place where the employee's duties
require him to be, regardless of whether the act of falling was initiated
by a condition personal to the claimant. "3 Here the claimant effectively
asked the court to shift the burden of bearing the cost of those injuries

31. Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d 249 (11th Cir. 1988).
32. 543 So. 2d at 213.
33. The public policy reason for placing this duty on hospitals is that they are in the best
position to control and review the medical staff, thus protecting those persons who seek medical
treatment in a hospital. Id. at 214.
34. 548 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1989). See decision below at 518 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1987).
35. In Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. McCook, 355 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1977), the Florida
Supreme Court held that an idiopathic injury is not compensable under workers' compensation
"unless the employment in some way contributes to the risk or aggravates the injury." Id. at
1168 (footnote omitted); see also Foxworth v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 86 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1955).
36. Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 16 So. 2d 342 (1944).
37. Grimes v. Leon County School Bd., 518 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1987).
38. Id. at 331.
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not caused by employment from the employee to the industry. The
supreme court reaffirmed its prior decisions, quashed the district
court's decision, and denied recovery, finding that the legislature, the
branch which created this remedy, was the proper branch to expand
the coverage of workers' compensation, if it deemed a change to be
necessary. Permitting recovery in this case would have broadened the
employer's exposure and, consequently, resulted in a higher cost for
workers' compensation coverage, which would eventually be passed
on to the consumer.
The final case involves the effect of private restrictions on the
value of real property for tax purposes. In Valencia Center, Inc. v.
Bystrom,3 9 a lessor and lessee entered into a long-term lease which
specifically limited the construction of high-rise buildings. The applicable zoning laws permitted high-rise buildings in excess of that agreed
to between the parties. In determining the property value for tax
purposes, the appraiser assessed the property on the basis of its highest and best commercial use. The Supreme Court of Florida's decision
to approve the assessment, 40 thus permitting the consideration of the
property's potential future use as a high-rise building, will most likely
force this property to be utilized for its best use within the zoning
restrictions. It would not be economically feasible to pay increased
taxes over a significant period of time while not receiving the most
beneficial use of the property.
The preceding cases illustrate just a few examples of legal issues
having potential economic impact. I believe it is extremely important
for litigants to inform the courts of the relevant economic impact in
a case. When appropriate, the parties should make every effort to
include this information in the trial record. Even if the potential
economic impact is significant in a certain case, the trial record limits
the scope of the factors which courts may consider in reaching their
decision.
In some cases, courts may not consider the economic impact of a
decision because their decision is controlled either by legislation or a
constitutional provision that affords the court no discretion. Although
numerous cases fall within this category, I would note that both trial
and appellate courts frequently have the discretionary authority to
consider the relevant economic factors.
Only within the last decade and a half has there been a true recognition that courts do substantially contribute to the country's
economic policy.41 Law and economics has recently become part of the
39.
40.
41.

543 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1989).
Id. at 217.
R. POSNER, supra note 1, at 16.

8
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regular curriculum in many law schools, and numerous books have
been written on the topic. 4 2 In my view, the substantial expansion of
government control of business enterprises by regulatory laws and
agency regulations places a much greater responsibility on the judicial
system. How well courts perform depends, in part, on how well educated and informed the legal profession and the judiciary are about
economic factors.

42.

See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (1975); C.

GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS (1984); A. KRONMAN & R.
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW (1979).

